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ESPIONAGE DURING THE TEXAS REVOLUTION
by Robert W. Kesting
During the months of February through July 1836, many Texas
citizens contributed toward the initial founding of Texas as an indepen-
dent entity. Most historians rightly or wrongly have sung the praises of
Sam Houston, Stephen F. Austin, and William Barret Travis. However,
there are countless others who contributed as much as those more famous
statesmen and military leaders. Some of these individuals were not con-
sidered Texas citizens nor did they have a vested interest in Texas property.
History has not been as kind to these individuals for various reasons. The
objectives of this narrative are to introduce one of those unsung heroes
of the Texas revolution, and to reveal one segment of his clandestine opera-
tion which provided Texas with valuable assistance in the fOTm of enemy
intelligence data.
Intelligence formation in its rudimentary form has changed little
throughout the centuries. Enemy strength, location, deployment, equip-
ment, and conditions have been some of the valuable factors which military
leaders needed to know in order for their operations to be planned and
executed with some degree of success. The Texas revolutionary forces also
needed this same type of information. However, this information is
valuable providing it arrives on time and is put to good use. Unfortunately,
communication was a major handicap during the 1830s. It took days and
sometimes weeks, especially by land, to obtain vital data in Texas. The
sea route was more dependable and faster, providing the weather was fair
and there were no unforeseen obstacles which would cause a delay. The
Texas army was able to obtain intelligence data by land using the spy
system to infiltrate enemy camps or to extract information from enemy
captives. But many of' the militia officers probably were not that
knowledgeable in the art of recognizing and confirming worthwhile in-
telligence. This thesis extends to the fledgling navy, which also lacked ex-
perience. However, one avenue which provided Texas with fairly accurate
and timely intelligence reports had to be considered a pleasant surprise
and quite possibly an unexpected one, especially in aiding the operations
of the army and navy. This source was William Bryan, citizen of the United
States, supporter of the Texas cause l and newly appointed general agent
for Texas in New Orleans.
Among the important decisions of the Provisional Government of
Texas, the appointment of William Bryan as general agent has to rank
as one of the most noteworthy. I William Bryan and his partner, Edward
Hall, operated a prosperous trade brokerage in New Orleans. Bryan had
a good reputation for his expert knowledge of the mercantile business and
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at times provided liberal extension of credit to Texas merchants, a vital
necessity for the financially weak government. Also, Bryan had numerous
trade contacts and access to banking institutions within the United States
in order to obtain loans, which was also vitally important for the survival
of Texas. 2 Another plus was that his political sympathies favored the Texas
revolutionary movement. 3 Based on these considerations, Stephen F.
Austin and William Wharton, members of the First Texas Commission
to the United States, appointed Bryan to the post of general agent for
Texas.
What was Bryan's attraction or motivation in dealing with the rebel
trade as opposed to the established Mexican trade? Perhaps Bryan con-
sidered this to be a monumental gamble on his part. He sympathized with
the Texas cause; however, like all successful businessmen he probably
calculated that a Texas victory against Mexico would certainly provide
his agency with continued wealth and a possible monopoly of the Texas
trade. Instant commissions would bring short-term profits to his agency,
but his goal was perhaps a long-range and continuous capital venture for
much higher monetary rewards in Texas real estate. The Texans did ap-
proach other New Orleans agencies, but Bryan was the only one willing
to risk advancing capital to the fledgling government. 4 Bryan's willingness
to assist Texas with a continuous flow of transportation, supplies, man-
power, and financial resources sealed the bargain.
Austin and Wharton required certain tasks be accomplished by the
Bryan and Hall Agency. For example, Hall was responsible for all Texas'
logistical needs, such as buying food and chartering vessels to transport
personnel and supplies to the Texas coast. Bryan accounted for all Texas
funds and communicated all information that was vital to the survival
of the Texas revolutionary government to the chief executive for the Texas
government. S The key phrase "provide all information that may be im-
portant" could have stipulated intelligence information regarding the ac-
tivities of Mexico.{, Perhaps it meant anything that pertained to Texas,
but this was one of those oral agreements between the commissioners,
Bryan, and Hall which probably will never be known. From vague
requirements, it can be determined that the Bryan and Hall Agency was
more than a typical trade brokerage. A more appropriate designation for
the agency was that proposed by Alma H. Brown in "Consular Service
of the Republic of Texas." Whether Bryan or the Texas commissioners
wished it this way is difficult to determine. Perhaps Bryan understood
from the beginning that his agency was to be the focal point for all Texas-
related activities in the United States, and it would have to operate under-
cover because of United States neutrality. Based on this premise and his
own personal interest, Bryan deemed it necessary to provide the Texas
government with communications which not only described numerous ac-
tivities involving Texas, but also pertinent information regarding Mex-
ico. Bryan knew that he was in a good location to provide Texas with
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somewhat accurate information regarding Mexico and its military
movements based on leaks of information from Mexican ports that were
communicated to the port of New Orleans via traders.
The latter part of 1835 and beginning of 1836 produced additional
tensions and heightened existing ones between Mexico and its disgruntled
and rebellious state of Coahulia and Texas. Plans to implement a recon-
quest to stamp out all vestiges of insurrection had passed from the opera-
tional to the execution phase. In order to implement a plan of such
magnitude. logistical support was a prime ingredient for a successful cam-
paign. In fact, Santa Anna already had given orders to procure at least
a thirty-day supply of rations because he anticipated a swift and decisive
campaign. 7 Moreover, he counted on being able to forage for additional
food supplies if the campaign dragged on. However, other valuable sup-
plies, particularly arms and ammunition, were not readily available. Unin-
formed as to actual enemy strength and resistance as he would march
toward their strongholds, Santa Anna initiated a plan to store vital sup-
plies at Mexican ports such as Matamoros.
The Mexican government's financial posture was in no condition to
sustain a protracted war after several years of quelling revolts south of
the Rio Grande. Therefore, it was imperative that a rapid and terminal
campaign be conducted to prevent further strain on the country's depleted
treasury. As a result, Mexican officials contacted their agents, particularly
in New Orleans, to provide the requested arms, ammunition, and other
provisions to be delivered and stored at predetermined depots. This ac-
tivity, coupled with the announcement that Mexico had closed Texas ports
to foreign trade, placed Bryan on notice.' By utilizing the merchant
grapevine, Bryan was able to obtain important information relating to
Santa Anna's movements and logistical plans. Perhaps his most valuable
intelligence was relayed in a letter to the Governor and Council of Texas
dated February 6, 1836. Bryan stated that Santa Anna had given his con-
sent to a specific mercantile house in New Orleans to purchase provisions
to support his Texas campaign against the Anglo-American rebels in the
Texas colony. Additionally, Bryan received information that Santa Anna's
supply ships were displaying a white-with-black-cross signal pennant. This
pennant was actually the flag of a mercantile business in New Orleans. 9
This information was received at Matagorda by R.R. Royall, chair-
man of the Matagorda Safety Committee, and subsequently communicated
to the Texas government. In Royall's letter addressed to the "Governor
and Council't dated February 18t 1836, he stated that "Santa Anna pro-
vision vessels will sail under white flag with a black cross this will be a
good mark for our vessels to be governed by."lO Bryan personally informed
each Texas naval commander with the exception of William Brown while
they were awaiting departure for the Texas coast. 11 However. it cannot
be determined that William Brown, master of the Liberty who patrolled
waters near the mouth of the Rio Grande, was informed of this informa-
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tion. Probably he was not aware of this data. Shortly after this informa-
tion was transmitted, the Texas armed schooner, Liberty, captured a Mex-
ican vessel, the Pelicano, on March 3, 1836. 12 Nineteen days later the Liber-
ty captured and detained a United States merchant vessel, the Durango,
in Matagorda Bay.13 On April 3, 1836, the Texas armed schooner Invin-
cible seized and detained another United States merchant vessel, the brig
Pocket, bound for the port of Matamoros, Mexico. 14 Was Bryan's infor-
mation helpful in affecting the capture of these vessels?
On March 3. 1836 while blockading the port of Sisal, Brown en-
countered an armed Mexican trade schooner, the Pelicano, commanded
by Captain Perez. 15 Bryan later referred to this vessel in his letter to the
governor and council dated March 29, 1836, as being "Mexican but owned
by Americans." 16 The registry showed that the Pelicano was built in
Baltimore. The Pclicano was probably a Mexican armed merchant vessel
which loaded supplies at New Orleans and departed that port on February
25, 1836. She was on her return voyage when she was captured by the
Liberty and subsequently taken to the port of Matagorda by a prize crew.
The Pelicano ran aground while attempting to cross a sand bar. Attempts
to salvage the cargo revealed that some gunpowder kegs were mingled with
barrels of flour. The amount of the powder reported by a local newspaper
and Captain Brown conflict, but Brown reported "280 kegs" were
discovered. This may have been an exaggeration. Brown later stated in
his letter to the editor of the True American, dated May 8, 1836;
...Sir-By Capt. Appleton, I am informed that J.W. Zacherie
denied that there was any powder on board the schooner Pelicano.
1 have found a number of letters on the prize which proved the above
fact. I feel it my duty to state these facts in regard to the powder.
There was no mention made of it on the manifest. I should k.eep a
constant lookout, and when I see the Mexican flag flying, I shall either
take it or be taken.... 17
It cannot be determined from existing documents whether the PeHcano,
in addition to flying the Mexican flag. was also displaying the signal pen-
nant identifying the cargo as belonging to Santa Anna's logistical sup-
port effort as reported by Bryan. However t the possibility cannot be
ignored.
Upon the Liberty's return to Matagorda, Brown may have been in-
formed of Bryan's communication by Royall or others. During this same
time, the Texas government was issuing orders to press into service
anything that could be useful to support the war effort. Ii On March 22,
1836, while patrolling in Matagorda Bay. the Liberty encountered a United
States vessel. the brig Durango, bound for the port of Matagorda. The
Durango was seized. boarded, and escorted into the port of Matagorda. 19
The Durango was no stranger to the Texas trade and coast, because this
vessel delivered Bryan's initial intelligence report to Matagorda on
February 18, 1836. 20 The Durango was known to transport worthwhile
supplies on her many recorded trips to Texas. In addition, James Reed,
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the last recorded owner of the vessel and a merchant in New Orleans, pur-
chased the vessel previous to July 9, 1835 on a business trip to Texas. The
registry paper states that the vessel was purchased from Mexican authorities
after the vessel was condemned. This statement may have meant Hispanics
or more likely Anglo-Americans who were Mexican subjects. This Durango
apparently was wrecked while attempting to cross the Brazos Bar. Reed
must have purchased this vessel at a bargain price for him to have traveled
from New Orleans to Texas. According to the registry document l Reed
affected repairs in Texas and sailed the vessel to New Orleans where the
vessel was registered officially. Reed declared himself a United States
citizen and a resident of New Orleans and also that he had hired another
New Orleans resident, James C. Ryan. as master of the Durango. 1 I Fur-
thermore, Reed ran a mail service to Texas and knew David Burnet well.
Also, he was an ex-partner of James Morgan, commandant of Galveston
Island. 22 The question remains: Was there a deal struck to ship contra-
band from the United States to support the logistical movement of Santa
Anna or was this an attempt at recovering insurance money for a vessel
that may have been over insured, which may account for the lack of pro-
test by Reed when the Durango was captured? In any event. claims were
not pressed immediately. The possibilities of these motives explaining the
capture and impressment lack documentation.
Once the Liberty seized the Durango she was placed under armed
guard at the port of Matagorda by a detachment of Texas Marines. 23 The
question now surfaces, what provoked Brown into capturing the Durango?
Only two feasible explanations may be considered. The first is that the
Durango. despite flying the American flag, also displayed the signal pen-
nant which Bryan described in his letter of February 6, 1836. In his letter
to the government on March 29, 1836, Bryan also mentions that the Liberty
robbed an American vessel of an "anchor and cable" and the Americans
considered this to be an "act of piracy." 24 This perhaps was the Durango,
because this vessel was the only known American vessel encountered by
the Texas navy during this time. Bryan did not mention this ship by name
because he was afraid that information and reports of this nature could
fall into the wrong hands, especially in the United States, which at the
time~ was prosecuting American citizens for violating the neutrality of the
United States government. In addition, he also was concerned that repeated
occurrences would provoke "bad press" in the United States and may
have some effect on the ultimate Texas goal of attaining recognition and
annexation. 25 To further allay fears that his communications to Texas
would fall into the wrong hands, in January 1836 he ordered his captains
"to destroy my communications to the government, should there be any
fears of capture.'·26 However, this initial explanation loses some of its
credibility because Santa Anna certainly did not want his supplies delivered
into enemy hands. At the time of the capture, the port of Matagorda was
controlled by Texas rebels. It was not until April 1836 that Matagorda
was taken by advance units of Santa Anna's army.
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The most logical and best documented explanation of why Brown
captured the Durango was that Texas needed the supplies and the vessel
was later used to transport troops and citizens along the coast. Previously,
it has been mentioned that the Texas government had authorized the con-
fiscation of private property to support the war effort and Brown pro-
bably was directed to confiscate the Durango. Unfortunately, a specific
order to this effect does not exist, but apparently some documents fell
into the hands of United States officials, who in 1837 and 1838 attempted
to settle the only claim arising out of the Durango affair and several claims
regarding the capture of the brig Pocket. John Forsyth. who was secretary
of state of the United States, gave instructions to Alcee La Branche, charge
d' affaires to Texas, on July 27, 1837. In his letter of instruction, he
directed that Le Branche demand immediate repayment of all claims aris-
ing from the Pocket affair. However, La Branche, in a letter to R.A. Irion,
secretary of state of the Republic of Texas, tells the story of the capture
of the Durango as it was told to him by Captain Ryan:
...The brig Durango, commanded by James C. Ryan, also an
American Vessel, was seized in Matagorda Bay and pressed into the
Texian service by orders of John A. Wharton, Adjutant general of
the Texian Forces, and William S. Brown, commander of the Texian
schooner Liberty. Said vessel sailed from the port of New Orleans
bound for the port of Matagorda. Captain Ryan finding himself
deprived of his vessel, and being unable to reclaim her in a legal way
was compelled to abandon her .... 27
Despite several key documents being lost which would further unravel some
of the mystery regarding the capture, at least a comparable order of John
A. Wharton did survive. It gives some indication of what a letter direc-
ting the confiscation of the Durango might have contained. In his direc-
tive to Major William T. Austin, local military commander of the Brazos
District, dated March 18, 1836, four days prior to the capture of the
Durangot he states:
...You are duly empowered to purchase or press any property that
you may deem of advantage to the army ... your own discretion will
govern you in many respects .... 21
A similar order might have been issued to Brown, whose sector of patrol
was Matagorda Bay, or this same type of order was given to another high-
ranking officer in charge of the mouth of the Colorado River and Brown
cooperated with him in the seizure of the Durango.
There is no existing evidence to support the claim that the Durango
was transporting contraband. However, the vessel carried food supplies,
which eventually aided the rebel army and later helped feed civilians tem-
porarily housed on Galveston Island. Between March 22. and May 22.
1836 after the Durango was moved from Matagorda to Galveston Island
to avoid the possibility of Santa Anna's advancing units retaking the vessel,
all that remained of the Durango's cargo was "43 barrels of damaged
flour ~" as recorded by W. Lawrence, quartermaster of Galveston Island. 29
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However, 100 barrels also remained on board the vessel, because this was
to be used to feed the garrison and prisoners on Galveston Island. Ap-
parently, officials had ordered transfer of the remaining cargo on board
the Durango to be stored on the Pocket and eventually transferred
elsewhere so military personnel could utilize the Durango to transport
troops and supplies along the coast. Mirabeau Lamar I secretary of war
for the interim government of Texas, ordered James Morgan to effect the
transfer on May 15, 1836. In his directive, he ordered the following:
...You will therefore cause her [Pocket] to take on board from
the Durango all flour that remains on her excepting one hundred bar-
rels which you will reserve for the use of the garrison, prisoners on
the island. You will be very particular to have an Acct. taken for the
number of barrels received from the Durango .... 10
The Durango disappeared from history after Whartn ordered the vessel
to assist in transporting 140 troops down the Texas coast on September
16, 1836. 31 Although gone, the Durango was not forgotten. A claim later
filed by the Sea Insurance Company of New York, the insurance com-
pany for the vessel and perhaps the cargo, plus added pressure by the
United States Department of State, provoked Texas into settling the claim
for $8,050.32. Perhaps the most convincing evidence that supports this
explanation is the fact that the Texas government Wa$ quite agreeable and
had no objections to the terms as opposed to the controversy which sur-
rounded the brig Pocket claims. B
The evidence suggests that the Durango affair was not initiated by
the information which Bryan provided on February 6, 1836. This inci-
dent probably was precipitated by other motivating factors. The most
credible is that Texas' needs took precedence over everything, including
international maritime law. Texans fighting for their survival paid scant
attention to signal pennants or national flags.
On March 20, 1836, the brig Pocket l a merchant ship from Boston
and a United States registered vessel, sailed from New Orleans to
Matamoros, Mexico, under American colors. The vessel was carrying
United States as well as Mexican citizens and cargo bound for the Mex-
ican port. On April 3, 1836, somewhere near the mouth of the Rio Grande,
she encountered the Texas armed schooner Invincible, mastered by Cap-
tain Jeremiah Brown. Captain Brown boarded the vessel and examined
the cargo against the manifest. He discovered that several items did not
agree. He also discovered war contraband such as arms, ammunition,
powder. and military dispatches and a map of the coastline of Texas among
other ship's papers. The dispatches and map were in Spanish. ~4 In a letter
from David Thomas, acting secretary of war for the government of Texas,
to Sam Houston, dated April 8, 1836, Thomas reveals the contents of the
capture:
...The cargo consists of 100 Ibs. of flour. lard-rice-6 or 700 Ibs.
of buscuit. She had on board very important documents giving
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information of the design of Sant Ana ... There is one document which
gives the information that Sant Ana was at Bexar-that his force in
all teamsters, women and children did not exceed eight thousand-that
his object was to secure all sea ports intended to land 1,000 men on
Galveston.... l'
29
In addition to the contraband cargo, dispatches, and map, also aboard
the Pocket were several Mexican naval officers who were easily identified
by Brown. Confronted by the obvious, Brown seized the Pocket. He im-
mediately escorted the vessel to Galveston Island and turned the cargo,
dispatches, map, crew, and passengers over to Morgan. The Pocket was
assigned to a prize crew. The original crew and passengers were detained
for several days. In the meantime, the Invincible set sail for the port of
New Orleans where she was scheduled to be refitted. J6 While at the port,
news of the capture reached the local newspapers. To further inflame the
situation, the crew and passengers of the Pocket had returned to New
Orleans. Additional "bad press" by New Orleans publications incited the
local merchants into a united front to do something to protect their com-
merce in the Gulf of Mexico. Local sentiment for the Texas cause
deteriorated rapidly when merchants were confronted with the choice of
maintaining friendly relations as opposed to the loss of revenue. Some
merchants published their displeasure in the local newspapers. One com-
ment extracted from the New Orleans Bee of May 6, 1836 states:
It is high time that American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico
should be protected from both Texas and Mexico and unless the
government interpose the evils will be very serious.... 37
Continuous pressure was applied to New Orleans federal officials. In ad-
dition to local merchant pressure, insurance companies joined the protest
and began to exert their influence. 38 The result was that the Invincible's
crew was arrested and placed on trial for piracy. 19 Furthermore, Com-
modore A.J. Dallas t United States Naval Squadron Commander t Gulf
of Mexico, was compelled to escort vessels in and out of Mexican ports. 40
The most important result of the trial was the fact that the M. De Lizardi
and Co., acting on a purchase order from Rubio and Co., a world-wide
agent for Santa Anna, authorized and instructed the M. De Lizardi and
Co. to purchase and ship the supplies which were discovered on board
the Pocket at the time of her capture. Also revealed was the fact that the
Mexican consul in New Orleans provided the dispatches. The map pro-
bably was constructed by one of the Mexican naval officers on board the
Pocket. Additionally, Rubio and Co. instructed the M. De Lizardi and
Co. to provide that signal pennant which Bryan alluded to in his cor-
respondence of February 6, 1836. Major Samuel Ellis, a Texas agent [spy]
and secretary to the Bryan and Hall Agency, exposed some of the evidence
revealed during the trial and the confirmation of Bryan's data. In an
editorial dated May 16, 1836 in the New Orleans Bee, he states:
...The evidence of one of the firm, given before the examining
court, was by the order of and charged to Rubio and Co., that the
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premium was charged to them and that they considered the cargo at
their own risk. That such was the understanding is evident from the
clause of the charter, which expressly stipulates that the brig shall carry
a signal generally known as that of the acknowledged agents of San-
ta Anna, which signal was to be furnished by Lizardi and CO.... ~l
Moreover, the trial produced three witnesses who told the court that Cap-
tain Howes, master of the brig Pocket. stated to each individual that once
they arrived at Matamoros he was contracted to transport Mexican troops
to Texas. U
The result of the Pocket affair confirmed the value of Bryan's in-
telligence communication of February 6, 1836. Furthermore, while the
trial was in progress, additional prizes were captured by the Texas navy,
but little is known of these seizures. Mexico was affected by this informa-
tion. Any hope of its army receiving a continuous flow of supplies was
destroyed by the many captures which took place during this time. The
destitution of the army is well documented, and Mexico had to change
the identification signal once the plot was exposed. Texas also was af-
fected by the results of Bryan's information. Texas used the captured goods
to its advantage during the battle of San Jacinto. Also, Texas had to read-
just her thinking and mode of operation upon the seas. As a result of the
Pocket affair, the Texas government was compelled to announce a
blockade of Mexican ports, which previously was given casual considera-
tion. 43 The ad interim government had to establish a district court with
admiralty jurisdiction to adjudicate prize vessels, which prior to the Pocket
capture was ignored. 44
In addition to the revelation of the signal used to identify Santa An-
na's supply vessels, Bryan obtained other pertinent information regarding
Santa Anna's troop strength, route of march, and overall condition of
his army. Sometimes this information was not always accurate and some
of it was known to the Texas government, but Bryan perhaps decided that
whether this information was factual or misleading should be a prerogative
reserved only for the military leaders of Texas to determine and cor-
roborate. His job was only to obtain and provide information. Accom-
panying his report of February 6, 1836, Bryan also reported that "General
Santa Anna is at Saltillo with 7000 men waiting provisions, which are very
scarce in his army.''45 In another communication, dated February 26, 1836,
he reported that "9000 men were ready to advance upon Texas. as soon
as provisions could be obtained. "46 In a report dated April 30, 1836, he
relayed that "news has come that the expedition against Galveston is about
leaving Matamoros under convoy of the Paragon. "47 This latter piece of
intelligence probably meant little to the Texas government, because this
expedition never became a reality while David Burnet was president.
However, Texas was placed on alert to protect its most valuable port. Dur-
ing the months of April and May 1836, most of the Texas navy was
deployed around Galveston Island. 4S
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 31
Bryan's intelligence operation was a small part of an overall network
of intelligence gathering employed by the Texas government during the
revolutionary period. This network, besides extending into the United
States, reached deep into Mexico. Both land and sea intelligence was glean-
ed from several sources. In particular, Texas had to compete with Mex-
ican espionage activities within the United States. Since Texas was not
recognized as a viable government, it was mandatory that some system
of intelligence collection be established in the United States. The Bryan
and Hall Agency provided that outlet, especially in New Orleans, where
enemy intelligence information arrived frequently from Mexican ports.
Besides his working under the veil of secrecy and constant pressure of ar-
rest and imprisonment for aiding the Texas cause, the Texas government
never appreciated Bryan's zeal and patriotism. Texas officials ironically
rewarded Bryan by replacing his agency with another, leaving him with
an enormous personal debt and damaged credit.
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